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Abstract
There are substantial cross-country dierences in labor supply late in the life cycle
(age 50+). A theory of labor supply and retirement decisions is developed to quan-
titatively assess the role of social security, disability insurance, and taxation for un-
derstanding dierences in labor supply late in the life cycle across European countries
and the United States. The ndings support the view that government policies can
go a long way towards accounting for the low labor supply late in the life cycle in the
European countries relative to the United States, with social security rules accounting
for the bulk of these eects.
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11 Introduction
There are substantial dierences in labor supply and in the design of tax and transfer pro-
grams across countries. The cross-country dierences in labor supply increase dramatically
late in the life cycle: using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Eu-
rope (SHARE), Figure 1 documents that while dierences in employment rates among eight
European countries are in the order of 15 percentage points for the 50-54 age group, they
increase to 35 percentage points for the 55-59 age group and to more than 50 percentage
points for the 60-64 age group. In this paper we quantitatively assess the role of social secu-
rity, disability insurance, and taxation for understanding dierences in labor supply late in
the life cycle (age 50+) across European countries and the United States. The paper makes
three contributions to the recent literature in macroeconomics studying government policies
and labor supply across countries.1 First, we use the newly released Survey of Health, Age-
ing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), as well as the US Health and Retirement Study
(HRS), to consistently document the facts on labor supply late in the life cycle (after the
age of 50) across many European countries and the US. Second, we document how the so-
cial security, disability, and taxation institutions vary across the countries in our empirical
analysis. Third, we build a structural life-cycle model of labor supply and retirement de-
cisions that explicitly models the key institutional dierences across countries and use the
model to assess the role of government policy in accounting for the micro-level observations
documented in the empirical analysis.
While it is well known that the tax and transfer programs vary substantially across
countries, there is substantial debate about their impact on labor supply decisions. A recent
literature in macroeconomics has shown that tax dierences can account for cross-country
dierences in labor supply, both in the context of the representative agent model (Prescott
(2002, 2004) and Ohanian, Rao, and Rogerson (2008)) and the life-cycle framework (Roger-
son and Wallenius (2009)). This research has often been criticized for assuming a labor supply
elasticity larger than the one typically estimated in empirical micro studies. When there is
an active extensive margin on labor supply decisions and heterogeneous agents, however, ag-
gregate labor supply responses are not driven by the preference parameter determining labor
supply responses along the intensive margin (e.g. the parameter estimated in micro data as
discussed in Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) and Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2011)). The
mass of agents that are close to being indierent between working or not becomes crucial
for labor supply responses (Chang and Kim (2006)). Building on these insights, we develop
a theory of heterogeneous agents in which labor supply varies both along the intensive and
extensive margins. Another important lesson from the literature is that aggregate labor sup-
ply responses to tax changes depend crucially on how tax revenue is spent (Prescott (2002,
2004)). Thus, we model in detail the social security system, which is arguably the most
important transfer program in the OECD countries. Moreover, using data from national
surveys, Gruber and Wise (2004) and Blondal and Scarpetta (1999) provide empirical evi-
dence on the importance of social security rules in aecting retirement incentives for many
countries. In addition, we model the disability insurance system since several empirical stud-
1See for example Prescott (2002, 2004), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006), Ohanian, Rao, and Rogerson
(2008), and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009).
2ies (Gruber and Wise (2004)) have also emphasized the potential importance of the so-called
\early retirement programs" in Europe such as disability insurance. The SHARE with its
harmonized cross-country methodology, allows us to document the facts on employment and
participation on transfer programs consistently across several European countries.
Our life-cycle model of labor supply and retirement decisions builds on French (2005),
Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2010), and Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2011). As in Erosa,
Fuster, and Kambourov (2011), we develop a neoclassical model of labor markets with non-
linear wages that accounts for labor supply choices both along the intensive and the extensive
margins. The key feature of the theory for delivering periods of non-participation is the
non-linear mapping between hours and earnings, which is convex at low hours of work. This
mapping is the competitive equilibrium outcome of an economy with a production technology
in which hours of work and number of workers are imperfect substitutes (see Hornstein and
Prescott (1993) and Osuna and R os-Rull (2003)). The social security, disability insurance,
and taxation systems in the United States and European countries in the study are modelled
in great detail. In particular, countries in the model economies vary in terms of (i) the social
security rules   such as early and normal age of entitlement, replacement rates, adjustments
for early and late withdrawal, the presence of early retirement schemes and occupational
pensions, and the contributions to the social security system, (ii) the fraction of people on
disability and the payments to disabled individuals, and (iii) the taxation of consumption,
capital income, and labor earnings. We model two education groups   college and non-
college   since we observe important dierences between these two groups in the data and
the fraction of men with college education varies substantially across countries. The baseline
economy is calibrated to US macro data as well as US micro data from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID). The calibration methodology follows the approach in Erosa,
Fuster, and Kambourov (2011) in order to pin down the value of some key parameters that
are important for the quantitative response of labor supply decisions to policy changes in
the theory. First, the intertemporal elasticity of leisure is set to 0.5 because this value
allows our model with non-linear wages to be consistent with a rich set of micro facts on
labor supply (see Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2011)). Second, the age prole and shock
process of labor productivity are estimated following an indirect inference approach that
explicitly controls for the selection problems that make the calibration of these parameters
dicult.2 In order to control for selection into employment, we use a Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) procedure to estimate   for each education group   a wage prole
and a wage process both in the PSID and in the model simulated data. The procedure
requires simulating the model economy for dierent values of the parameters determining
the age prole of wages and the stochastic process of wages until the GMM estimates in the
simulated data recover the estimates obtained in the PSID data.
We nd that the baseline economy matches very well the life-cycle patterns in hours
worked for college and non-college individuals in the US, even though these patterns were
not explicitly targeted by the calibration. The baseline economy is quantitatively consistent
with the fact that the prole for average annual hours is relatively at until the age of 50 and
2Given that wages are only observed for workers, the estimation of the wage process is aected by non-
random selection into employment. This problem is likely to be more severe for individuals close to the
retirement age. Moreover, this is a serious problem because the labor productivity process late in the life
cycle plays a crucial role in determining how social security impacts on retirement decisions.
3starts declining after that age. Moreover, the decline in working hours late in the life cycle
is quantitatively consistent with the data both along the intensive and extensive margins
underscoring the fact that the baseline economy represents a good theory of the US labor
supply decisions late in the life cycle.
In a set of quantitative experiments, the US government policy is replaced with the
policies of Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and France. The main ndings are
that the model accounts fairly well for how labor supply decreases late in the life cycle for
most countries. The model matches remarkably well the large decline in the aggregate labor
supply after age 50 in Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. The results support the view that
government policies can go a long way towards accounting for the low labor supply late in
the life cycle for these European countries relative to the United States, with social security
rules accounting for the bulk of these eects and income taxation having much milder eects
on labor supply. The quantitative experiments predict that, relative to the United States,
the hours worked by men aged 60-64 is 43% in the Netherlands, 53% in Spain, 36% in Italy,
and 37% in France. In the data, these numbers are 49% in the Netherlands, 66% in Spain,
44% in Italy, and 29% in France.
Our ndings imply that labor supply is much less responsive to taxes than previous
papers in the literature (Prescott (2002, 2004)). While Prescott (2002) nds that dierences
in taxes in France and the United States account for virtually all of the 30-percent dierence
in labor input per person between these countries, our ndings only account for a 10-percent
dierence in labor supply. A more comprehensive comparison of the results should consider
that Prescott (2002, 2004) assumes that all tax receipts are distributed lump-sum back to
households based on the idea that public goods are good substitutes for private consumption
(e.g., public schools and hospitals are good substitutes for private schools and hospitals).
This assumption is crucial for generating a large response of labor supply to tax changes,
as discussed by Prescott (2002, 2004). Our quantitative experiments, however, assume that
apart from the social security tax receipts, which are used to nance the social security and
disability systems, none of the other tax receipts are rebated back to consumers. Hence,
in an experiment we simulate the French and the US policies under the assumption that
all tax receipts are rebated back to households. We nd that the aggregate labor supply
under French policies is now 24% lower than under US policies, a result that is close to the
ndings in Prescott (2002, 2004) and more than twice the value of 10% that we obtained in
our baseline experiment with no rebates.
A natural question is whether modelling non-linear wages is important for the quanti-
tative eects of policies on labor supply. In order to investigate this issue, we consider a
new baseline economy with linear wages and simulate the introduction of French policies
into this economy. Two main ndings emerge. First, aggregate hours worked in France
relative to the United States are approximately the same as in the economy with non-linear
wages (10% lower). Second, however, non-linear wages matter importantly for labor supply
responses after age 60. For the age group 60 to 64, labor supply in France relative to the
US is 0.56 with linear wages and 0.37 with non-linear wages. This result underscores that
the interaction of non-linear wages with social security rules is important for understanding
retirement decisions across countries.
Relative to the recent literature analyzing the role of taxation and social security on labor
supply dierences across countries (Prescott (2002, 2004), Ohanian, Rao, and Rogerson
4(2008), Alonso-Ortiz (2009), and Wallenius (2009)), a distinguishing feature of our paper is
to model the progressivity of taxes on earnings. We nd that replacing the progressive tax
system on earnings with a at tax has a small eect on labor supply in the US economy
(about a 2% increase) while the increase in labor supply in France is much larger   the
hours worked per person aged 25-65 rise by 6.7%. This nding is explained by the fact that
earnings are taxed much more progressively in France than in the US. Thus, the progressivity
of the tax system matters for understanding labor supply dierences across countries. French
(2005) and Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2010) model, in a rich life-cycle framework, the eect of
health on retirement and labor supply decisions. In the same spirit, we studied the eect of
disability and evaluate its importance for labor supply dierences across countries. We nd
that disability insurance policies do not play an important role except for the Netherlands
and Spain.
This paper also builds on an important macro literature quantitatively evaluating the US
social security system.3 This basic theoretical framework with incomplete markets and life
cycle has been extended by French (2005) and Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2010) to study social
security and health insurance and by Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) to evaluate disability
insurance. The contribution of our paper is to focus on how government policy (taxation,
social security, disability, and other retirement programs) accounts for labor supply decisions
across countries.
2 Empirical ndings
The focus in this paper is on the labor supply of men late in the life cycle (after the age of 50).
We use the newly released Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) as
well as the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to document these facts. The SHARE
is a European cross-national panel of micro data on health and socio-economic status which
was administered in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. It has data on 11 countries and more
than 45,000 individuals aged 50 or older. The survey provides a balanced representation of
various European regions: Scandinavia   Denmark and Sweden; Central Europe   Austria,
France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands; and Mediterranean   Spain,
Italy, and Greece. Israel, the Czech Republic, and Poland were added in the 2006 wave. The
dataset provides detailed longitudinal individual data on employment, (sources of) income,
(sources of) transfers, health, consumption, and assets. It is harmonized with the HRS and
the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). The HRS surveys, over every two years,
more than 20,000 Americans over the age of 50. It collects detailed longitudinal individual
data on variables such as income, work, assets, pension plans, health insurance, disability,
physical health and functioning, cognitive functioning, and health care expenditures.
3See, for instance, Auerbach and Kotliko (1987), Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995), Conesa
and Krueger (1999), Huggett and Ventura (1999), Fuster (1999), and Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu
(2003, 2007).
52.1 Labor supply
Figure 1 reports mean annual hours worked after the age of 50 for eight European countries
  Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Italy, and France. In
the analysis we use data from the 2006 SHARE.4 We can immediately see that the labor
supply behavior of the various European countries in the sample is dramatically dierent for
individuals aged 60 to 64. The dierences in hours worked appear relatively small for the
50-54 age group but become quite substantial at ages 55-59 and are very large at ages 60-64.
Overall, the cross-country dierences in labor supply increase by a factor of 3 between the
ages of 50-54 and 60-64. For the 60-64 age group, mean annual hours worked are as large
as 1500 in Switzerland and Sweden, around 750 in Germany and Spain, around 500 in the
Netherlands and Italy, and around 300 in France. As the bottom two panels in Figure 1
indicate, most of the dierences in labor supply are driven by the extensive margin (the
fraction of workers who report positive hours worked), but there are also dierences in labor
hours along the intensive margin (mean hours worked for those who report positive hours
worked). Table 1 summarizes the cross-country data on labor market participation, part-
time work, and full time work late in the life cycle. Figure B-2 illustrates two additional
interesting ndings.5 First, in all countries individuals with college education work on average
more hours than men with non-college education. Second, the cross-country dierences in
labor supply late in the life cycle are much more pronounced for non-college than for college
individuals.6
Figure 2 puts the documented facts on European labor supply in perspective by com-
paring the labor supply patterns in Switzerland, Spain, and France to those in the United
States. The facts on hours worked in the United States are obtained from the 2004 HRS.7
Figure 2 indicates that hours worked in the United States between the ages of 50 and 74 are
higher than in France and Spain but lower than in Switzerland. Indeed, hours worked are
higher in the US than in all the European countries except for Switzerland and Sweden.
2.2 Program participation late in the life cycle
In order to get a preliminary look at the eects of various income support programs on labor
market participation after the age of 50, Table 2 reports the fraction of individuals receiving
the following benets: (i) social security (SS) retired worker benets, (ii) disability insurance
(DI) benets, (iii) unemployment insurance (UI) benets, and (iv) private pension benets.8
Three observations stand out when analyzing the evidence from Tables 1 and 2. First,
4Appendix B-IV reports the same facts from the 2004 SHARE. The overall patterns are quantitatively
very similar across both waves. The data from the 2008 and 2010 waves have not yet been released. Appendix
B-I provides a detailed description of the variables from the SHARE used in the analysis.
5Figures B-1 to B-12 and Tables B-1 to B-8 can be found in Appendix B.
6Tables B-1 and B-2 report the data on labor market participation separately for non-college and college
individuals.
7Appendix B-II provides a detailed description of the variables from the HRS used in the analysis.
Furthermore, it illustrates that the mean annual hours worked for college and non-college individuals in the
50-74 age group in the HRS are quantitatively very similar to those in the PSID.
8Tables B-3 and B-4 present the program participation results separately for non-college and college
individuals.
6in each country, older individuals have higher program participation and lower labor market
participation. Second, the fraction of people not working is highly correlated with the
availability of income support programs across countries   for a given age group, countries
with higher program participation tend to have a lower labor market participation. Third,
the relative importance of the dierent programs in providing income support for individuals
younger than 65 varies substantially across countries. While the fraction of individuals
age 65 and above receiving social security retired benets is above 75% in all countries,
that fraction varies substantially for individuals younger than 65. In order to discuss the
evidence in more detail, let us focus on the 60-64 age group, which is the age group for
which social security rules vary more across countries. The fraction of individuals aged 60-
64 receiving social security benets is below 30% in the US, Sweden, and the Netherlands,
but is as high as 66% in Italy and 70% in France. In the Netherlands, 43% of individuals
aged 60-64 collect private pension benets paid by mandatory occupational plans, which
provide early retirement benets prior to the social security retirement age of 65. The
fraction of individuals aged 60-64 collecting disability insurance is important for Sweden
(16%), Denmark (13%), and the Netherlands (20%). Unemployment insurance is quite
important in Germany where about 10% of individuals between the ages of 50 and 64 collect
unemployment benets. Unemployment insurance is also important in France, but much
less so than in Germany. Summing up, the various income support programs across the
countries in the sample present individuals with alternative paths to retirement, and the
relative importance of each of these programs varies substantially across all the countries.
2.3 Disability enrollment
In this subsection, we take a more detailed look at the disability insurance programs in Eu-
rope and the United States. We use the 2004 and 2006 waves of the SHARE to document the
facts on disability insurance enrollment in the European countries in the sample. Appendix
B-I provides a detailed description of the variables related to disability insurance payments
from the SHARE used in the analysis. The questions in the 2004 and the 2006 wave dier
slightly, and this partially accounts for some of the quantitative dierences reported below.
The qualitative message, however, is very similar.
Figures 3 and B-6 report the fraction of individuals receiving disability insurance pay-
ments. For the year 2004, we use information on income sources last year and classify
individuals as disability insurance recipients if they report having received public disability
insurance, or a public invalidity or incapacity pension, or private (occupational) disability
or invalidity insurance. For the year 2006, we classify individuals as disability insurance
recipients if they report having received in the previous year main public disability insur-
ance pension or sickness benets, or secondary public disability insurance pension or sickness
benets, or occupational disability or invalidity insurance.
Figure 3 shows that the fraction of individuals receiving disability insurance varies sub-
stantially across the eight European countries in the sample. In particular, the fraction of
disability insurance recipients in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands is higher than in
Germany, Italy, and France.9 It is clear that in order to understand the behavior of labor
9The 2006 questionnaire also asks individuals about receiving public benets since the last interview two
7supply late in the life cycle it would be important to incorporate the eects of disability
insurance in the analysis. Large dierences in the fraction of disability insurance recipients
may manifest themselves in cross-country dierences in the observed participation rates as
most of the disability insurance recipients do not work   for example, the 2004 SHARE
reveals that the fraction of individuals on disability who report working is 15% in Spain,
26% in Italy, 23% in the Netherlands, and 27% in Denmark. In addition, those on disability
who continue to work report much lower hours worked than those who are not on disability.
One major exception, however, is Sweden   in the 2004 SHARE data, 60% of the disability
insurance recipients in Sweden reported positive work hours.
3 The model
We develop a life-cycle theory to evaluate how various government policies aect labor supply
decisions across countries. The theory models a world of small open economies that dier
in their social security, disability, and tax systems.10 Without loss of generality, the model
abstracts from cross-country dierences in the level of TFP. This is because preferences
and technology are chosen to be consistent with balanced growth, ensuring that the level
of TFP does not aect labor supply decisions. The model economy features heterogeneous
agents but, for simplicity, abstracts from the labor supply decisions of women and models
only men. The baseline economy is calibrated to US micro and macro data. The calibrated
model economy is then used to simulate government policies for various European countries
and to quantitatively assess how the variation in government policies accounts for the cross-
country variation in labor supply and retirement decisions.
3.1 Individuals: preferences, endowments, and shocks
The baseline economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals. Individuals
face uncertain lifetimes and can live, at most, J periods. They dier in terms of their
education (college versus non-college). Each period individuals face disability, mortality,
and labor productivity shocks. The stochastic processes driving these shocks depend on age
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years ago (in 2004). We use this information to construct an alternative measure of the fraction of disability
insurance recipients. In particular, we classify as disability insurance recipients all those who report to have
received either sickness benets or disability insurance benets since the previous interview in 2004 two years
ago. The results, reported in Figure B-6, reveal that the fraction of individuals receiving disability insurance
payments is higher in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands than in Switzerland, Italy, and France.
10For the purpose of this paper, the assumption of a small open economy is a better description of reality
than assuming a world of small closed economies. Moreover, since the model abstracts from altruistic agents,
assuming a closed economy would imply implausibly large eects of social security on the aggregate stock of
capital and interest rates (Fuster (1999) and Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2003)).
8where c and (1   h) denote consumption and leisure, respectively. An individual's time
endowment in each period is one. The date-t utility function takes the form




The utility function is consistent with balanced growth and allows for an active extensive
margin on labor supply decisions. The modelling of preferences is motivated by the obser-
vation that there are no important cohort eects in the labor supply of men. It also allows
the theory to be consistent with the fact that there are large permanent dierences in labor
productivity across individuals (heterogeneity in xed eects) but not in their lifetime labor
supply (see the discussion in Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2011)). The Frisch elasticity
of leisure is given by  1
 . Individuals enter the model at age 25, and the college decision is
exogenous. The retirement decision, however, is endogenous.
3.2 Technology
There are a large number of plants and each plant is a collection of jobs. We assume that
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where h denotes the workweek, K is the amount of capital for the job, and Az is eective
labor in the job. Capital is assumed to depreciate at a rate  per period. Eective labor in the
job is given by the product of the worker productivity z and the level of technology A, which
grows over time at an exogenous rate g. Note that, for a xed workweek, the job technology
exhibits constant returns to scale in capital and eective labor. Moreover, as discussed in
Osuna and R os-Rull (2003), when " =  the job technology reduces to the standard Cobb-
Douglas technology where total hours of eective labor is what matters. When " >  the
hours and eective labor are imperfect substitutes and the composition between these two
inputs matters. When " = 1 the technology is linear in hours and corresponds to the case
where workers are not subject to fatigue.
3.3 The plant's problem
The plant's production plan is given by the choice of hours of operation h, capital K, and
eective labor N, where N = Az. The plant takes as given the earnings schedule ~ w(h;N)
and the rental rate of capital r. In equilibrium, the earnings schedule is a non-linear function
of the workweek h and a linear function of eective labor N. To show this point, consider a
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9Next, notice that plants will only operate if prots are non-negative. Free entry and the fact
that plants can be created at zero cost imply that in equilibrium plants will make zero prots
(will not extract economic rents from workers). Hence, competition for workers implies that
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which gives









It follows that the earnings schedule ~ w(h;N) is linear in eective labor N and non-linear in
hours of work h. When " =  earnings are also linear in h: When " >  the hourly wage
rate increases with h. In this case, households would be better o by selling employment
lotteries to rms (Hornstein and Prescott (1993)). However, we rule out this possibility by
assuming that households cannot commit to work when the realization of the employment
lottery implies that they should work.
3.4 Government policy: taxation, social security, and disability
insurance
Government policy varies across countries along many dimensions. In order to evaluate
the eects of government policy on labor supply late in the life cycle, we model the cross-
country variation in the social security system, disability insurance, and tax institutions. In
particular, the baseline economy is calibrated to salient features of the US tax, disability,
and social security systems and is then used to evaluate the eects of replacing the US
government policy with the policies pursued in various European countries. Appendix A
provides a detailed description of the government policies in the countries considered in the
analysis.
Social security. Social security is nanced with a payroll tax ss. The social security
system species an early retirement age. Once individuals attain the early retirement age,
they can choose to le for social security benets (e.g., collect pension benets). Retired
individuals can choose to work, but their earnings may be taxed at a high rate due to pro-
gressive taxation of earnings. It is assumed that individuals cannot work any longer after
the age of 75 so that this is the oldest possible age of retirement in the model economy.
In equilibrium, the age of retirement will dier across individuals because of heterogeneity
in earnings, disability status, and assets. We carefully model the incentives for early/late
retirement by modelling how pensions vary with the retirement age of individuals. In this
way, the model captures how the cross-country variation in accrual rates aects the age of
retirement.11 Pensions also depend on the ability type of workers (education and xed ef-
fects). In particular, for each ability type, pensions depend on the average lifetime earnings
11The number of years since retirement may also aect pensions if pensions are not adjusted by productivity
growth (mean real wage growth) during retirement. In this case, \normalized" pensions decrease during
retirement at the rate of productivity growth in the economy.
10across workers of that ability type. This assumption considerably simplies the computation
of the model since modelling pensions as a function of the actual earnings history of indi-
viduals requires adding an extra state variable in an already dicult dynamic programming
problem.12
We model cross-country variation in social security rules along many dimensions: i) the
normal and early retirement ages; ii) the benet formula determining how pensions vary
with average lifetime earnings, such as the progressivity of the formula and the rules deter-
mining minimum and maximum pensions; iii) how pensions vary with the age of workers at
retirement (accrual rates); iv) the formula used to compute average lifetime earnings such as
the number of years considered in the computation and whether wages are adjusted by real
wage growth or by ination when computing lifetime average wages; v) the formula deter-
mining the payroll taxes paid to nance pensions since the tax rate may vary with earnings;
vi) whether pensions are kept constant in real terms during retirement or increase with real
wage growth; vii) the presence of occupational pensions or early retirement programs (such
as in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and France).
Disability insurance. We model the probability of becoming disabled as determined by
government policy. This approach is motivated by the following evidence from the SHARE.
First, Jurges (2005) documents that there are small dierences in objective measures of health
status across countries. Second, Borsch-Supan (2005) shows that the large cross-country
dierences in disability cannot be explained by dierences in health or demographics and
concludes that institutional dierences account for the variation in disability across countries.
As documented in Section 2 most of the disability insurance recipients in the SHARE do
not work. Hence, the model assumes that individuals cannot work while on disability. It is
also assumed that disabled individuals remain disabled for the rest of their lives and that
they collect a social security payment which depends on the ability type (education and
xed eect) and the number of years since retirement because pensions may be adjusted for
productivity growth during retirement.
Taxes. Following McDaniel (2007), it is assumed that the government taxes consumption
(c), investment expenditures (I), capital income (k), and labor earnings (T(y)). Her
estimates are used to pin down the cross-country variation in the rst three tax rates (c, I,
k). Dierently from McDaniel (2007), we assume that labor earnings are taxed according
to a progressive tax function that we estimate using OECD data. We assume that labor
earnings and capital income are taxed based on the country of residency of the individual
supplying the factors of production. Investment taxes are levied by the government of the
country where investment is located, independently of the nationality of the owner of the
factor of production. As described in McDaniel (2007), investment taxes stand for general
taxes (including sales and value added taxes) paid on investment expenditures, as well as
customs and import duties and taxes on the use of goods to perform investments activities
(such as motor vehicle taxes and highway taxes). Taxes on consumption include property
taxes paid by households, general taxes on good and services, excise taxes, customs and
import duties, taxes on specic services, and taxes on the use of goods to perform activities.
12Our model is not convex since it features an active extensive margin (due to non-linear wages) and a
retirement decision.
11Government expenditures. The tax revenue from the social security payroll tax ss
is used to nance the social security and the disability insurance programs. The government
uses the rest of the tax revenue (from I, k, c, and T(y)) to purchase a public good that
does not provide utility to individuals or, equivalently, entering the period utility function
in an additive separable fashion. Later, in a sensitivity analysis, we shall assume that these
tax revenues are rebated back to individuals.
3.5 Capital markets
There are a large number of nancial intermediaries that take deposits from consumers (D)
and make investments in (potentially) many countries. When an intermediary purchases Ic
units of capital in country c, it pays an investment tax I
c Ic. The purchases of capital are
constrained by the amounts of deposits D as follows:
X
c
Ic(1 + c) = D: (9)
Intermediaries take as given the international interest rate i, the return on capital rc, and
the tax rate I



































= i + ; for all c: (11)
In a world of open economies, dierences in the investment taxes across countries are arbi-
traged away so that the return on capital per unit of expenditure is equated to the interna-
tional (gross) interest rate.
Due to free entry in the nancial industry, nancial intermediaries make zero prots.
Financial intermediaries sell annuity contracts to individuals so that the gross interest rate
on deposits paid to an age j individual is 1+i
j . The after tax gross return on deposits of an
age j individual in country c is









since the taxation of capital income is based on the country of residence.
123.6 The individual's problem
We use recursive language to describe the decision problem of an individual. In order to
simplify the notation we abstract from the fact that the education type of an individual
determines her earnings, disability, and mortality processes. The state x of an individual is
given by her age j, assets a, earnings shock z, disability status d, and social security status
f (age of retirement if individual has led for social security benets). The timing of events
within each period is as follows. Individuals start the period knowing x and then decide how
much to consume, work, save, and, if applicable, whether to apply for social security benets
or not. We assume that individuals with disability cannot work and that retired individuals
can work as long as they are able to.
The value of state x is




c) c + (1 + g)a
0 = Rj a + w(h) zj + b(x)   T(x);
a
0  0;
where R denotes the gross interest rate (net of taxes), T(x) represents total taxes paid on
labor earnings (and benets), and b(x) denotes social security benets received (pension and
disability benets).
4 Calibration
The baseline economy is calibrated to the US economy in the year 2004. While we consider
a world of small open economies, the international interest rate is calibrated so that the net
capital ows in the baseline economy are zero. Following Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov
(2011), we calibrate the age prole and the shock process of labor productivity using an
indirect inference approach. Moreover, the preference parameter  is set so that the in-
tertemporal elasticity of leisure is 0:5: Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2011) conclude that
a Frisch elasticity of leisure of 0.5 allows this model to be consistent with a rich set of micro
level facts on labor supply. This nding also applies in the current model economy with
endogenous retirement.
Model period. The model period is set to be a year.
Preference parameters, time endowments, mortality rates, and disability risk.
Following Prescott (2004) and Osuna and R os-Rull (2003), the time endowment is set at
5200 hours a year (100 hours per week) and the discount factor  is chosen to match an asset
to income ratio of 3. The preference parameter , determining the consumption weight in the
utility function, is set to 0:5 so that prime age individuals work about 42% of their available
time. The mortality risk for college and non-college individuals is taken from Bhattacharya
and Lakdawalla (2006). The calibration of the parameters determining disability rates in
the model target the fraction of men on disability by age and education in the HRS (see
Appendix B-II). We assume that non-college individuals face a constant probability of




p1 if j 2 [30;40)
p1 e(j 39) p2 if j 2 [40;75]:
(13)
The probability of becoming disabled for college individuals is assumed to be a constant
fraction of that for non-college individuals: pcol;j = pcolpj: The parameter pcol is pinned down
so that the model is consistent with the fact that the fraction of college individuals who are
disabled is about half the fraction of non-college individuals who are disabled in the HRS in
the year 2004. The parameters (p1;p2) target the fraction of disabled individuals in the age
groups 30-39 (1.5%) and 50-54 (7.3%).13
Technology parameters. We nd that an international (pre-tax) interest rate of 4:9%
achieves the target of zero net international capital ows. The rate of depreciation of capital
is set at 5:3%, the labor share  at 0:69; and the rate of labor augmenting technological
progress g = 0:014 per year, which is the average productivity growth in the US during the
postwar period (Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2007)). In order to calibrate the
parameter "; we use the fact that in equilibrium the elasticity of the hourly wage to a change
in hours worked is given by "
 1 (see the discussion in Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2011)).
Aaronson and French (2004) estimate this elasticity to be 0:40 so that we set " = 1:4 .
Tax rates on consumption, investment, capital income and labor earnings.
Following McDaniel (2007), the tax rate on consumption is set to c = 0:075, the investment
tax rate is set to I = 0:032, and the tax rate on capital income is xed at k = 0:232. We
follow Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2010) in parameterizing taxes on labor earnings and
t the following eective average tax function to data from the OECD tax database:
(y=W) = a0 + a1(y=W) + a2(y=W)
; (14)
where  gives the average tax rate paid by an individual with earnings y normalized by
average earnings in the economy W. We use the OECD data to compute eective labor
income taxes at various points in the wage distribution and include in the calculation central
government, local, and state taxes net of tax credits. Dierently from Guvenen, Kuruscu,
and Ozkan (2010) we exclude social security contributions (which are modeled explicitly)
and cash benets (such as social assistance and housing assistance).14 Table B-5 reports the
regression results and the R2s obtained for all countries which are quite close to 1.15 Figure
6 plots the earnings tax functions for all the countries considered in the analysis.
13The target for the age group 30-39 is obtained using data from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the
Social Security Bulletin (2005). The calibration sets p1 = 0:0029; p2 = 0:054; pcol = 0:59. For the calibrated
parameters the model predicts that the fraction of individuals on disability are 1.4% and 7.3% for age groups
30-39 and 50-54, respectively.
14In the US case, the regression is run with data on taxes at 35 points in the wage distribution which,
expressed as a percentage of average earnings W, are given by 10%;20%;30%;40%;50%;75%;100%;:::;800%
of W. For many European countries there is an initial range of income for which the average tax rate is
constant and equal to a minimum level, which is often equal to 0. In this case, we only run the regression
for income levels for which the tax function increases with income.
15The data is available online at www.oecd.org under the link to the \Tax-Benet Calculator tool."
14Social security and disability. The social security tax rate is set to ss = 0:124
with a cap b y on social security taxation xed at 2:47 of average earnings in the economy
(W). Half of the social security taxes are paid by the employer and are not subject to
the personal income tax on earnings. Social security benets depend on average lifetime
earnings (adjusted by the rate of growth in the economy) according to the benet formula in
the US economy (see Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2007)). The early and normal
retirement ages are set at 62 and 65, respectively. If an individual retires before the normal
retirement age of 65, her pension is reduced by 6:7% per year of early retirement. When
individuals retire after the normal retirement age, the pension is increased by 6:5% per year
of delayed retirement up to age 69.16 Retired individuals of age 62 to 64 are subject to an
earnings test   earnings above 33% of average earnings in the economy are taxed at a rate
of 50% until all the pension income has been exhausted.17
Calibration of labor productivity. We emphasize that this is a crucial step in our
calibration strategy. While the age prole of productivity and the parameterization of wage
shocks have a rst order eect on the retirement decisions of individuals, these objects are
hard to calibrate. First, note that labor productivity is not directly observed in the data.
While we do observe wages, they are observed with error since it is well known that there is
measurement error in hours and, hence, in wages in the PSID data. Second, wages are only
observed for individuals that work. To the extent that there is an active extensive margin
late in the life cycle, the estimation of the wage process for individuals close to the retirement
age is going to be aected by selection issues. This is a serious problem because the labor
productivity process late in the life cycle plays a crucial role in determining how the social
security system aects retirement decisions. In order to deal with these problems we follow
an indirect inference approach. Building on our previous work, we use a GMM procedure to
estimate, for college and non-college individuals, the following annual wage process both in
the PSID and in the model-simulated data:
ln ^ wij = xj  + i + uj + j; (15)
where ^ wij stands for the hourly wage of individual i of age j, xj is a quartic polynomial in









) is an idiosyncratic transitory shock, and uj follows a rst-order autoregression:






);u0 = 0: (16)
While the parameters (;;2
;2
;2
) vary across education types, this is omitted in the
notation to avoid clutter. The model economy is simulated for dierent parameterizations
of the stochastic process for labor productivity z   it is assumed to follow the stochastic
process specied in (15). In particular, we iterate on the parameters determining the age




16A reform of the US social security in 1990 increased the delayed retirement credit from 3% to 8%. This
change was introduced gradually. For the cohorts that were aged 66 to 69 in the year 2004, the delayed
retirement credit was 6.5% per year, up to age 69.
17In 2000 the earnings test was eliminated for individuals above the normal retirement age.
15the GMM procedure in the simulated data recovers the estimates obtained in the PSID
data.18
5 Calibration results
There are 21 parameters that are calibrated by solving the model economy. Table 3 shows
the values and the calibration results for three of these parameters: average earnings in
the economy W, the consumption weight , and the discount factor . For each education
group, the indirect inference approach is used to pin down the quartic polynomial for the
wage-age prole (5 parameters) and the stochastic process of wages (the parameters giving
the variance of xed eects, the persistence and the variance of innovations, and the variance
of the transitory shock).19
5.1 Hourly wages: age prole and stochastic process
We use an indirect inference approach to nd the parameters for the trend and the stochastic
process of labor productivity   the parameters are such that the same trend and stochastic
process for hourly wages are obtained in the actual and model data. Figure B-7 shows that
the trend in hourly wages for college and non-college workers in the data is the same as in
the model-simulated data. Similarly, Table B-6 reports that the stochastic process for hourly
wages estimated in the model-simulated data is similar to the one estimated on the PSID
data. In particular, the same estimates are obtained when we use a GMM estimation to
estimate both in the model and in the PSID data the variance of the xed eect component,
the persistence and the variance of the innovation of the AR(1) shock, and the variance of
the transitory component.
5.2 Age prole of hours of work: performance of the model
The calibration procedure did not explicitly target the various facts on labor supply. Nev-
ertheless, it is important to point out that the baseline economy does an excellent job in
accounting for the facts on labor supply. Figure 4 reports mean annual hours worked over
the life cycle between the ages of 25 and 65 both in the model and in the data using various
cohorts from the PSID.20 Since the PSID is a relatively small dataset, the data is grouped
into age and cohort groups. Each age group consists of four ages   for instance, the age-62
group includes all individuals between the ages of 62 and 65. A cohort in a given year is
comprised of all individuals who turn 18 years in that year and each cohort group consists
of three cohorts   for instance, the 1976 cohort includes cohorts 1976, 1977, and 1978.
18The transitory shock j estimated in the PSID data represents both genuine transitory shocks and
measurement error in wages. We pin down the measurement error in wages using the estimates in Erosa,
Fuster, and Kambourov (2011).
19When we estimate the process, both in the model-simulated and actual data, we allow the variance of
the transitory shocks to vary with age according to a cubic polynomial.
20See Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2011) for a more detailed description of the facts on labor supply
in the United States.
16The model does very well in matching the life-cycle pattern in hours worked both for
college and non-college individuals. In particular, the model is quantitatively consistent
with the fact that the prole for average annual hours is relatively at until the age of 50
and starts declining after that. This decline in working hours is steeper among non-college
than college individuals, and starts at an earlier age for the former group both in the PSID
and in the model data. The theory also accounts for the fact that college individuals tend to
work slightly more hours than non-college types. For each of the two education categories,
the decline in working hours in the PSID data is mainly driven by the extensive margin,
although there is also a small decline in hours worked along the intensive margin late in
the life cycle (see Figures B-8 and B-9). The model is quantitatively consistent with these
patterns in the data.
Figure 5 reports mean annual hours for college and non-college individuals in the 50-74
age group, as this paper mostly focuses on labor supply for individuals in this age group.
Since in the PSID there are not many observations for people above 60 years of age, the
data is grouped across all cohorts in the PSID.21 The model is remarkably successful in
matching quantitatively the decline in average hours worked after age 50 in the US. This
observation gives us some condence that the theory developed in this paper is an appropriate
quantitative framework for assessing how the introduction of European-style policies would
aect labor supply in the United States.
It is important to emphasize that incomplete markets play an important role in generating
the life-cycle patterns of working hours predicted by the theory. Young individuals work
long hours because they need to build a buer stock of savings to self-insure against income
risk. This mechanism explains why working hours are roughly at during the rst part of
the life cycle despite the increasing age prole of wages. By age 50 the stock of assets is
suciently large, and individuals can aord to reduce their labor supply when they receive a
low temporary wage shock. This mechanism accounts for the pronounced decline in annual
working hours late in the life cycle. Modelling disability provides an additional channel
which contributes to the decline in working hours late in the life cycle.
6 Quantitative experiments
In order to evaluate the role of government policies in accounting for the cross-country dif-
ferences in labor supply, we replace the US social security, disability, and tax systems of
the baseline economy with the policies of Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and
France.22 Before presenting the results, it should be emphasized that government policies
21For robustness, we have constructed a similar graph using data from the HRS (2004) and the picture is
quantitatively quite similar to the one obtained by aggregating all cohorts in the PSID.
22We do not model the policies of Germany, Sweden, and Denmark. Recall that the empirical analysis in
Section 2 revealed that unemployment insurance is an important transfer program in Germany. A proper
analysis of German policies would require that the theory in this paper is extended to incorporate unemploy-
ment. Our empirical ndings also showed that the Swedish disability insurance program is unique because,
unlike those in the other countries, most individuals on disability in Sweden work. Given the importance of
the disability program in Sweden, properly modelling Swedish policies would require extending the model
economy in order to allow for disabled people to work. Furthermore, our theory abstracts from government
employment and other transfer programs, something which Rogerson (2007) has argued to be important
17vary across countries in a large number of dimensions. The taxation of earnings, capital
income, and consumption varies across countries. The social security system diers sub-
stantially on many dimensions such as the contributions to the system, the pension benet
formula, the early and normal retirement ages, and the penalties and bonuses for early and
late retirement. Due to the complexity of these rules, the detailed description of these insti-
tutional features for each country in our study is provided in Appendix A. For each country,
the policy experiments set the fraction of college individuals to match the ratio of college
men among the total population aged 50 and older in the 2004 SHARE.
6.1 Cross-country dierences in institutional arrangements
We now document that the social security, disability, and tax systems dier importantly
across countries.
6.1.1 Consumption, investment, capital income, and earnings taxes
Table 4 documents how taxation varies across countries. The US is characterized by a low
consumption tax relative to the European countries. While the consumption tax is 7.5% in
the US, it goes from 15.3% in Switzerland to 25.5% in France. Thus, the consumption tax
generates important tax wedges that may have an eect on labor supply across countries.
Investment taxes also vary across countries, but less than consumption taxes. Moreover, as
previously shown, dierences in investment taxes are arbitraged away with capital mobility,
and they should not aect much the labor supply across countries. Capital income taxes
vary in the tight range of 19.0% to 23.2%, with the lowest value in Spain and the highest
value in the US.
Figure 6 plots earnings taxes across countries. Two observations stand out. First, earn-
ings taxes in the US do not appear to be low relative to those in the European countries.
Second, earnings taxes are progressive in all countries. However, they are more progressive in
Europe than in the United States as evidenced by the fact that in several European countries
(Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands) individuals with earnings below 40% of average earnings
pay zero earnings taxes. US earnings taxes are the highest for people with earnings at 50%
of mean earnings in the economy, while they are the lowest for individuals with earnings
above 300% of mean earnings.
6.1.2 Social security
Social Security programs vary substantially across countries. They also vary over time as
most countries have reformed their social security systems. We model social security rules
as close as possible to the rules prevailing in the year 2004. However, for countries where
the early retirement regulations changed substantially after a reform we model the rules
that applied to individuals aged 60-64 in the 2004 SHARE when making their retirement
for understanding labor supply in Scandinavian countries. As a result, we do not analyze the eects of
Scandinavian policies at this point.
18decisions.23 The quantitative experiments below will mostly focus on understanding labor
supply dierences for this age group.
Social security regulations on early retirement dier substantially across countries. While
in some countries there is a minimum age requirement for collecting pensions (62 for the US,
63 for Switzerland, 60 for Spain, and 55 for the Netherlands), in other countries the age re-
quirement is irrelevant since individuals can retire after having contributed a certain number
of years to the system (40 years in France and 35 years in Italy). Switzerland and the US pe-
nalize early retirement with actuarially fair reductions. Each year of early retirement (after
the early retirement age but before the normal retirement age) is penalized with a reduction
of about 6.8% in the pension. Each year of retirement deferral is rewarded with a 6.5%
increase in the US. In Switzerland the reward is 5.2% for 1 year of deferral, 10.8% for 2 years
of deferral and up to 31.5% for 5 years of deferral. Italy (prior to the 1993 reform) provided
the strongest incentives for early retirement. A worker with 40 years of contributions collects
a pension with the maximum replacement rate of 80%, implying that most workers by age
60 would not see their pension increased by postponing retirement. Moreover, a worker with
35 years of contributions (and an age around 55) can retire with a replacement rate of 70%.
Postponing retirement by 5 years would only increase the replacement rate by 10%, which
is grossly actuarially unfair. France also provides strong incentives for early retirement. At
age 60, individuals can retire with no penalty if they have contributed for 40 years to the
system.24 Each missing year of contribution is penalized by 5%, which is actuarially unfair.
In the Netherlands, the early retirement schemes imply that individuals see no change in
their pension benets if they retire after age 60. In this case, the replacement rate is set
at 70% regardless of the age of retirement. Individuals can retire as early as age 55 but
with a replacement rate of 25%, which increases up to 55% for individuals retiring at age
60. Appendix A describes in more detail the social security rules for each of the countries
considered in our analysis.
Table 5 documents that social security taxes vary signicantly across countries, with
taxes being the lowest in the US and Switzerland and the highest in Spain and Italy. In all
countries but Italy, payroll taxes are capped at a suciently high level of earnings. Hence,
average social security taxes tend to decrease with the level of earnings.
6.1.3 Disability pensions
We model the fraction of individuals on disability as determined by government policy.
Hence, the parameters determining the probability of becoming disabled are recalibrated for
each country. The calibration targets, in the 2004 SHARE, the fractions of disabled indi-
viduals in the age groups 50-54 and 55-59 and the ratio between the fractions of disabled
individuals in the college and non-college categories at age 50-54. The model assumes that
23For Italy, we model the rules prevailing before 1993 because for workers with 15 years of contributions at
the end of 1992, the rules of the pre-1993 regime apply, and individuals will retire under the pre-1993 regime
until the year 2015 (see Gruber and Wise (2004)). For similar reasons, in the Netherlands we model the
early retirement schemes of the ABP plan for workers born after 1942 and according to the rules prevailing
after 1997.
24For France, we assume that non-college and college individuals have 40 years of contribution by age
60 and 63, respectively. For Italy, we assume that non-college and college individuals attain 35 years of
contribution by age 57 and 62, respectively.
19the government pays a disability pension to disabled individuals. The features of the var-
ious disability pensions in our analysis is pinned down using information from the \Social
Security Programs Throughout the World" project administered by the US Social Security
Administration.25
6.2 Main results
Figures 7-9 present the main ndings of the paper. The model accounts very well for the
decline in labor supply late in the life cycle for most countries. In particular, it matches
remarkably well the large decline in aggregate labor supply after age 50 in Spain, Italy, and
the Netherlands. The results show that government policies can go a long way towards
accounting for the low labor supply late in the life cycle in these countries. The main
discrepancy between the quantitative experiments and the data is that the theory tends to
underpredict the hours of work for individuals younger than 60 in Switzerland and overpredict
the hours of work for individuals aged 55-59 in France.26
6.3 Labor supply dierences late in the life cycle: driving forces
Table 6 compares the predictions of the theory with the data on hours of work in each
country relative to the US. Tables B-7 and B-8 present these facts separately for non-college
and college individuals. In evaluating these predictions, it is most interesting to focus on
individuals aged 60-64 since these are the ages where the variation in social security rules
are likely to have a more pronounced eect on labor supply behavior. Moreover, the data
reported in Table 6 shows that after age 60 there are huge dierences in labor supply between
the US and the European countries (except Switzerland). Relative to the United States, the
hours worked by men aged 60-64 is 49% in the Netherlands, 66% in Spain, 44% in Italy, and
29% in France. The quantitative experiment predicts a value of 43% for the Netherlands,
53% for Spain, 36% for Italy, and 37% for France. On the other hand, the data show that
men aged 60-64 work 26% more hours in Switzerland than in the US. The theory predicts
that men in Switzerland work 4% less than in the US.
The experiment just discussed changed for each country four \primitives": (i) the social
security system; (ii) the tax code (consumption, investment, earnings, and capital income
taxes); the fractions of individuals with (iii) disability and with (iv) college education. We
now evaluate the relative importance of these mechanisms in generating labor supply dif-
ferences across countries. In a rst experiment, the model economy is simulated assuming
that all countries have the US tax system (consumption, investment, earnings, and capital
income taxes) but dier in terms of the other country-specic policy parameters (social secu-
rity system and the fraction of individuals with disability and with college education). The
25This information is available on the US Social Security Administration website at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw.
26The model predicts reasonably well the hours of work for college individuals in France aged 55-59, but
overstates the hours of non-college individuals in that age group. One clue for why the model overpredicts
the labor supply of the non-college is provided by the following observation from the SHARE   about 10% of
the French non-college individuals aged 55-59 collect unemployment insurance benets. Our model, however,
abstracts from unemployment insurance.
20results from this experiment are reported in Table 6 in the row labeled \US Taxes." The
results indicate that the tax system accounts for only a small part of the decline in the labor
supply of men late in the life cycle in the European countries relative to the US. Focusing on
the age group 60-64, replacing the Spanish tax system with the US one increases the labor
supply of men in Spain relative to the United States from 53% to 54%. Thus, it accounts
for only a small fraction of the overall change in labor supply predicted by the model for
Spanish men aged 60-64. For the other countries, replacing their tax systems with the US
tax system delivers an increase in labor supply of 0 percentage points for Switzerland, 6 for
the Netherlands, 6 for Italy, and 5 for France. As in Spain, taxation accounts for a small
fraction of the cross-country dierences in labor supply predicted by the theory.
In a second experiment, the fraction of college individuals in the baseline economy is kept
constant while all the other policy parameters vary across countries. The results are reported
in the row labeled \US Fraction of College." We nd that the eects of this experiment are
only quantitatively important for Spain and Italy. The relative labor supply of men aged
60-64 increases by 9 percentage points (from 53% to 62%) in the case of Spain and by
4 percentage points (from 36% to 40%) in the case of Italy. Recall that the fraction of
disabled individuals also varies across countries. In order to isolate how this factor matters
for labor supply dierences across countries, we compute the average labor supply among
those individuals in the population who are not disabled (see the row labeled \Disability").
We nd that disability policies matter importantly for the Netherlands and Spain. When
focusing on people who are not disabled, the labor supply of individuals aged 60-64, relative
to the US, increases from 0.43 to 0.50 in the Netherlands and from 0.53 to 0.63 in Spain.
For all the other countries, disability policies do not play an important role in accounting
for the low labor supply relative to the US.
In a third experiment, the model economy is simulated assuming that all countries have
the US social security system. The results from this experiment are reported in the row
labeled \US Social Security" in Table 6. Altogether, the results indicate that social security
accounts for most of the variation in labor supply across countries for individuals aged 60
to 64. This is true even in the case of Spain where the low fraction of college people and
the large number of people on disability play an important role. While these two eects
account for a reduction in the Spanish labor supply of 0.19 relative to the US labor supply,
the decrease due to the social security system alone amounts to 21 percent of the US labor
supply. As a result, the social security system in Spain accounts for at least half of the
dierences in labor supply between individuals aged 60-64 in Spain and in the US.27 The
Dutch social security rules account for a reduction in labor supply of individuals aged 60
to 64 of 0.33 relative to the US, accounting for more than half of the total labor supply
dierences across these two countries.28 Moreover, the social security system accounts for
27While the Spanish baseline economy predicts that the labor supply of individuals aged 60 to 64 is about
47 percent lower than in the US, the sum of the eects of all policies in isolation (dierences in (i) taxation,
(ii) fraction of college educated, (iii) fraction on disability, and (iv) social security system) account for a
total reduction of 41 percentage points, with the remaining dierence being accounted for by the non-linear
interactions between these policies.
28As in Spain, the eects of all Dutch polices (in isolation) add up to a reduction in the labor supply of
individuals aged 60-64 of 0.46 relative to the US, while their combined eect accounts for a decrease in labor
supply of 0.57 relative to the US.
21all of the low labor supply of aged 60-64 individuals in France and Italy relative to the US.
Social security is also important for understanding cross-country dierences in labor sup-
ply late in the life cycle across education groups (Tables B-7 and B-8). With the exception of
Switzerland, in all of the European countries the labor supply of individuals aged 60-64 rela-
tive to the US is lower for non-college than for college individuals. Our theory accounts well
for this pattern in the data. We nd that the social security rules in the European countries
have a particularly strong negative eect on the labor supply of non-college individuals.
6.4 Aggregate labor supply dierences: ages 25-65
Focusing on aggregate hours of work for individuals aged 25-65, the theory predicts that men
in Switzerland work as much as in the United States. For all other countries, men work less
than in the US with aggregate hours ratios ranging from 0.90 in France to 0.83 in Italy.29
The theory thus implies that labor supply dierences late in the life cycle are much larger
than the ones observed across all age groups.
7 Discussion on taxes and labor supply
We now turn to discussing the importance of some of the features of the model environment.
7.1 Rebating tax receipts with lump-sum transfers
At rst sight, our ndings imply that labor supply is much less responsive to taxes than
previous papers in the literature (Prescott (2002, 2004) and Ohanian, Rao, and Rogerson
(2008)). While Prescott (2002) nds that dierences in taxes in France and the United States
account for virtually all of the 30-percent dierence in labor input per person between these
countries, our ndings only account for a 10-percent dierence in labor supply. A more
comprehensive comparison of the results, however, should consider that Prescott (2002,
2004) assumes that all tax receipts are distributed lump-sum back to households based on
the idea that public goods are good substitutes for private consumption (e.g., public schools
and hospitals are good substitutes for private schools and hospitals). Prescott (2002, 2004)
argues that this assumption is crucial for generating a large response of labor supply to
tax changes.30 On the other hand, our quantitative experiments assume that none of the
tax receipts are rebated back to consumers. Hence, we now simulate in our baseline model
economy the French and the US policies under the assumption that all tax receipts (from
c, k, I, and T(y)) are rebated back to the households. We nd that the aggregate labor
supply under French policies is now 24% lower than under US policies, a result that is
close to the ndings in Prescott (2002, 2004) and more than twice the value of 10% that
we obtained in our baseline experiment with no rebates. Despite the similar quantitative
ndings, it is interesting to point that the implied Frisch elasticity of labor supply in our
model is less than a fourth than the one in Prescott (2002, 2004). When there is an active
29The ratios of aggregate hours for the Netherlands, Spain, and France are 0.87, 0.89, and 0.90, respectively.
30Tax rebates oset the wealth eects of tax changes, which aect labor supply in a direction opposite to
the one from the substitution eect.
22extensive margin, labor supply responses to policy changes are not well approximated by the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply (see Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) and Erosa, Fuster, and
Kambourov (2011)).
7.2 Linear wages
Modelling non-linear wages allows the baseline economy to match reasonably well the de-
crease in labor hours after the age of 50 in the US data. A natural question is whether this
feature matters for the eect of policies on labor supply. In order to investigate this issue,
we now consider a new recalibrated baseline economy with linear wages. As before,  is
calibrated to match the asset to income ratio, W to match average earnings, and the inter-
national interest rate is set so that the baseline economy with US policies has zero net capital
ows. French policies are then introduced into the new baseline economy with linear wages.
Two main ndings emerge. First, aggregate hours worked in France relative to the US are
approximately the same as in the economy with non-linear wages (10% lower).31 Second,
however, non-linear wages matter importantly for labor supply responses after age 60. For
the age group 60 to 64, labor supply in France relative to the US is 0.56 with linear wages
and 0.37 with non-linear wages. The larger change under non-linear wages is accounted for
by labor supply responses along the extensive margin.
7.3 Proportional taxes
Relative to the literature analyzing the role of taxation on labor supply dierences across
countries, a distinguishing feature of our paper is to model the progressivity of taxes on
earnings. In order to investigate the importance of this feature, we simulate the US and
France under proportional taxes. We compute a new recalibrated US baseline economy with
a at tax on labor earnings equal to the average tax in the original US baseline economy.
This procedure is then repeated for France. It is found that replacing the progressive tax
system on earnings with a at tax has small eects on labor supply in the US economy
(about a 2% increase). On the other hand, the increase in labor supply is much larger in
France, with an increase in the hours worked per person aged 25-65 of 6.7%. This nding is
due to the fact that the progressivity of the taxation of earnings is much higher in France
than in the US. It follows that the progressivity of the tax system matters for understanding
labor supply dierences across countries.
7.4 Closed economy
The baseline experiments consider a world of open economies. As a robustness check, it is
interesting to analyze a world of closed economies. Since the international interest rate was
calibrated to generate a zero net capital ows into the US, we now simulate French policies
in a closed economy. We nd that the aggregate labor supply and the decline in labor
31This nding is consistent with the message in Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2011) who show that non-
linear wages do not aect the quantitative response of labor supply to a permanent tax change, although
they do amplify substantially the response to temporary wage and tax variations.
23supply late in the life cycle under French policies do not depend signicantly on whether the
economy is open to international capital ows or not.
8 Concluding remarks
The paper studies the role of social security, disability insurance, and taxation for under-
standing dierences in labor supply late in the life cycle (age 50+) across European countries
and the United States. A life-cycle model of labor supply and retirement decisions that ac-
counts well for key regularities of labor supply in the US is rst built. The quantitative
framework is then used to replace US government policies (social security, taxation, and dis-
ability insurance) with European style policies. The main nding is that the model accounts
well for the decline in labor supply late in the life cycle for most European countries in the
study, supporting the view that government policies can go a long way towards accounting
for labor supply dierences across countries. Social security rules account for the bulk of
cross country dierences in labor supply late in the life cycle (with its contribution varying
from 50% to 100%), but other policies also matter. In accounting for the low labor supply
relative to the US at ages 60 to 64, taxes matter importantly in the Netherlands (6%), Italy
(6%), and France (5%); disability insurance policies are important for the Netherlands (7%)
and Spain (10%); and the low fraction of college individuals is a contributing factor in Italy
(4%) and Spain (9%). When we simulate tax policies under the assumption that all tax
revenues are rebated, the eect of taxes is as large as in Prescott (2002, 2004), despite the
fact that our parameterization of the utility function implies a much lower elasticity of labor
supply (about one fourth of the one in Prescott (2002, 2004)). In our framework, due to an
active extensive margin, labor supply responses to policy changes are not well approximated
by the Frisch elasticity of labor supply (Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) and Erosa, Fuster,
and Kambourov (2011)).
Our paper is a rst step towards developing a quantitative life-cycle theory to evalu-
ate tax and transfer programs across countries. In future research, we plan to incorporate
unemployment and medical expenditures in order to evaluate the eects of unemployment
insurance and health policies across countries. The main nding in this paper, that gov-
ernment policies matter importantly for the large dierences in labor supply of men across
countries, should be even more important for women. Hence, it would be interesting to ex-
tend the framework in this paper and, following the work of Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura
(2008), model both males and females.
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27Table 1: Labor Market Participation, Men, SHARE 2004.
Age
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
Switzerland
Working full time 79.4 82.1 56.0 28.1 11.5
Working part time 10.3 5.1 6.7 8.8 4.9
Not working 10.3 12.8 37.3 63.1 83.6
Sweden
Working full time 90.1 76.4 53.6 7.1 1.7
Working part time 2.5 4.2 10.8 11.7 68.8
Not working 7.4 19.4 35.6 81.2 91.5
Denmark
Working full time 79.9 69.7 46.2 7.6 0.0
Working part time 1.8 4.2 5.3 16.3 11.0
Not working 18.3 26.1 48.5 76.1 89.0
Netherlands
Working full time 84.6 68.7 23.3 2.0 2.1
Working part time 2.5 5.1 3.3 4.0 2.9
Not working 12.9 26.2 73.4 94.0 95.0
Germany
Working full time 77.1 70.9 25.9 6.5 0.7
Working part time 2.4 2.5 6.2 4.0 2.0
Not working 20.5 26.6 67.9 89.5 97.3
Spain
Working full time 71.2 60.4 28.0 2.5 1.8
Working part time 7.2 8.7 8.7 0.6 0.6
Not working 21.6 30.9 63.3 96.9 97.6
Italy
Working full time 62.4 45.8 19.2 8.3 4.0
Working part time 19.5 5.3 7.0 3.6 1.2
Not working 18.1 48.9 73.8 88.1 94.8
France
Working full time 76.2 54.8 11.7 2.3 0.6
Working part time 3.0 1.9 3.1 0.6 0.0
Not working 20.8 43.3 85.2 97.1 99.4
United States
Working full time 77.6 70.8 46.4 25.1 12.3
Working part time 3.3 4.0 9.3 10.9 11.6
Not working 19.1 25.2 44.3 64.0 76.1
Note: Authors' computations from the 2004 SHARE for the European countries and the 2004 HRS
for the US.
28Table 2: Program Participation, Men, SHARE 2004.
Age
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
Switzerland
SS retired worker benets 0.0 1.3 2.5 88.5 98.3
DI benets 5.9 10.1 11.3 3.3 6.8
UI benets 7.1 1.3 2.5 1.6 1.7
Private pension benets 0.0 6.3 25.0 37.7 55.9
Sweden
SS retired worker benets 1.9 12.4 21.1 83.3 99.0
DI benets 11.7 13.5 15.5 14.0 13.1
UI benets 0.5 0.8 2.0 15.3 14.2
Private pension benets 5.3 4.9 11.2 20.5 10.8
Denmark
SS retired worker benets 0.0 3.6 34.1 76.1 99.0
DI benets 12.6 14.4 13.3 7.6 0.0
UI benets 9.0 13.7 4.4 1.1 0.0
Private pension benets 1.2 0.7 14.1 39.1 39.0
Netherlands
SS retired worker benets 0.0 1.0 2.1 83.2 99.3
DI benets 12.3 17.1 20.0 6.4 0.0
UI benets 3.7 6.0 5.8 1.0 0.0
Private pension benets 0.0 5.4 43.3 73.8 79.3
Germany
SS retired worker benets 1.9 5.2 46.6 91.4 96.1
DI benets 5.4 8.0 7.6 1.1 2.0
UI benets 11.6 9.9 8.0 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 0.0 1.4 10.2 22.3 28.1
Spain
SS retired worker benets 2.8 9.9 34.8 88.1 91.4
DI benets 13.4 10.6 11.0 5.0 4.3
UI benets 6.3 4.6 8.4 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 1.4 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.6
Italy
SS retired worker benets 6.8 35.1 66.1 81.3 86.1
DI benets 6.9 7.5 7.0 8.9 5.8
UI benets 0.7 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 0.0 2.2 5.7 5.2 6.9
France
SS retired worker benets 2.1 14.3 70.6 96.5 99.0
DI benets 6.2 7.5 0.5 4.1 3.2
UI benets 5.2 7.5 6.4 1.2 0.0
Private pension benets 0.7 4.5 47.1 66.1 74.2
United States
SS retired worker benets 0.0 0.0 26.9 85.9 95.3
DI benets 5.7 9.0 12.9 0.0 0.0
UI benets 5.1 3.8 3.4 1.0 0.2
Private pension benets 4.8 13.2 27.4 45.2 48.5
Notes: Authors' computations from the 2004 SHARE for the European countries. The evidence
for the US is from Coile and Gruber (2004). 29Table 3: Calibration.
Parameter Value Target Data Model
W 2.9 Ratio of mean economy to mean male earnings 0.80 0.80
 0.5 Fraction of hours worked, age 30-45 42% 42%
 0.983 Asset to income ratio 3.0 2.93
Table 4: Consumption, Investment, Capital Income, and Earnings Taxes.
US Spain France Switzerland Netherlands Italy
Consumption, Investment, and Capital Income Taxes
c 0.075 0.196 0.255 0.153 0.238 0.226
I 0.032 0.089 0.145 0.085 0.155 0.150




W ) 0.02 0.44 0.00 0.13 0.40 0.44
Min. Tax 0.0 0.0 0.076 0.0 0.0 0.0
Max. Tax 0.354 0.383 0.468 0.364 0.463 0.406
(0:5) 0.118 0.022 0.079 0.057 0.043 0.051
(1:0) 0.174 0.112 0.146 0.112 0.137 0.168
(3:0) 0.272 0.267 0.310 0.246 0.349 0.329
Notes: The consumption, investment, and capital income taxes are taken from McDaniel (2007) while
the earnings taxes are computed by the authors from OECD data. W indicates average earnings in the
economy while y indicates individual earnings. (x) denotes the average tax on earnings for an individual
whose earnings are a fraction x of average earnings.
30Table 5: Social Security Taxes.
Public Pensions Occupational Pensions
US 0.124 if y 2 [0;2:47W]
0 if y > 2:47W
Spain 0.283 if y 2 [0;1:64W]
0 if y > 1:64W
France 0.1575 if y 2 [0;W] 0.095 if y 2 [0;W]
0.027 if y > W 0.22 if y 2 (W;8W]
0 if y > 8W
Italy 0.27
Netherlands 0.238 if y 2 [0;0:79W]
0.0585 if y 2 (0:79W;1:16W]
0 if y > 1:16W
Switzerland 0.101 0 if y 2 [0;0:27W]
j if y 2 (0:27W;1:07W]
0 if y > 1:07W
Notes: Social security taxes are computed by the authors from OECD data. W indicates average earnings
in the economy while y indicates individual earnings. ss for public pensions in Switzerland equals zero
if y < 0:27W and the individual is older than the normal retirement age. ss
j for occupational pensions
in Switzerland depends on the individual's age: 0.07 until 35, 0.10 for the 35-45 age group, 0.15 for the
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Details of the Social Security Systems
A-I Spain
The Spanish public pension system is of a dened benet type and is organized in three regimes: the
General Regime, the Special Regimes (for a few occupations), and the Regime for Civil Servants. We model
the General Regime (R egimen General de la Seguridad Social) after the 1997 reform, which applies to more
than 70% of workers.32 The early and normal retirement ages are 60 and 65 years. The initial pension is
proportional to individuals' average earnings in the last 15 years of work (the earnings base). In computing
the earnings base, individuals' monthly earnings are indexed to ination (but not to real wage growth) except
for the earnings in the last 24 months. The model assumes that an individual that retires at age 65 collects
a pension with a replacement rate of 90% of base earnings.33 Moreover, pensions decrease by 8% per year of
early retirement and increase by 2% per year of late retirement. There are minimum and maximum pensions
equal to 37% and 90% of the economy's average earnings. Pensions are nanced with a payroll tax of 28.3%.
Contributions into the system are capped at an earnings' ceiling of 1.64 of average earnings in the economy.
The Spanish Social Security considers three degrees of disability: incapacity to work in the usual occupation
(IPT), incapacity to do any kind of job (IPA), inability to do any kind of job plus requiring assistance to
carry the basic vital functions (GI). Since the model assumes that individuals cannot work when disabled,
we model the disability pension of the IPA-GI degree of disability, which has the same replacement rate as
regular pensions. Since pension benets in Spain are indexed to ination, in the model pensions are kept
constant as individuals age.
A-II Italy
There were important reforms in the Italian public pension system in 1992 and 1995. However, the rules of
the pre-1993 regime apply to workers with at least 15 years of contribution at the end of 1992. Since people
will retire under the pre-1993 system until about the year 2015 (Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004)), we consider
the social security rules prevailing before 1993 to be consistent with the data in the 2004 and 2006 SHARE.
About 2/3 of the work force in Italy is insured with the National Institute of Social Security, whose most
important fund covers the private sector employees (Fondo Pensioni Lavoratori Dipendenti or FPLD). For
these workers, the pension benet is computed as the product of three terms: pensionable earnings (average
of 5 years before retirement), number of years of contributions (up to 40 years), and a 2 percent factor per
year of contribution. The normal retirement age is 60 for males but individuals can retire at any age if they
have contributed at least 35 years to the system. In modelling the Italian social security system, we assume
that individuals reach 35 years of contributions at age 57 for non-college and at age 62 for college types. The
minimum pension is about 22 percent of the economy's average earnings (5,300 Euros in 2004). The payroll
tax in 1992 was 27.17% of which the worker paid 8.34%. The entitlement to a permanent disability pension is
based on the absence of all other forms of income. We model disability pensions as equal to regular pensions
(including the penalties for early retirement). The model also incorporates a minimum disability pension of
4,700 Euros in 2004.
32See Boldrin, Jim enez-Mart n, and Peracchi (2004) for a very detailed description of the Spanish Social
Security System
33This replacement rate is obtained by assuming that individuals have 30 years of contribution at age 65,
which is the average years of contribution at retirement in Spain, as reported in Boldrin et al. (2004). The
replacement rate for an individual retiring at age 65 is 50% for the rst 15 years of contributions, increases
by 3% for each additional year of contribution between 15 and 25 years, and increases by 2% per year of
additional contribution between 25 and 35 years. There is a maximum replacement rate of 100%.
40A-III The Netherlands
The Dutch pension system has two pillars: a at-rate public pension and a mandatory occupational pension
scheme. In addition, there is a separate scheme to nance early retirement pensions. The normal retirement
age is 65 years and early retirement is allowed from age 55. From age 65 on, residents in the Netherlands
(for at least 50 years) receive a at-rate pension benet which is related to the minimum wage and which is
nanced in a pay-as-you go fashion (old-age pension). This at pension benet is about 30% of the average
earnings in the Netherlands (OECD (2009)). Since the benet value is linked to the minimum wage (updated
biannually), we assume in the model that the at-rate pension grows at the same rate as real wages.
Most employees are entitled to a supplementary occupational pension. Occupational pensions are
earnings-related and part of collective labor agreements covering 90% of the labor force (see Bovenberg
and Gradus (2008)). Approximately 94% of employees are covered by dened benet pension funds and 77%
of them received a pension related to their lifetime average earnings while the rest receive a pension related
to their nal salary (see OECD (2009)). Consequently, occupational pensions are modelled as depending on
the lifetime average earnings of the individual type (education and xed eect). In computing the lifetime
average earnings, annual earnings are indexed with real wage growth. The replacement rate is 70% and
benets are reduced by a franchise amount which varies with the pension fund. In the paper, we assume
a franchise of 40% of average earnings which is the value that applies for most workers (see Table 2.2 in
Euwals, van Vuuren, and Woltho (2010)). We also assume that occupational pensions grow at the same
rate as wages.
Early retirement schemes allow individuals to retire before age 65. Participation in these schemes is
mandatory for employees. Early retirement schemes were introduced in the 1970's (VUT) and operated as
a pay-as-you-go system. These schemes were gradually replaced by the capital funded pre-pension (PP)
schemes that try to create more incentives to work. According to Euwals et al. (2010, page 6), transitional
arrangements were introduced in order to smooth the transition from the at rate VUT scheme to the PP
scheme. In practice, however, it turned out that most older workers continued to face early retirement ar-
rangements that were close to the old schemes. An exception was the ABP, the pension fund for civil servants
and individuals working in the educational sector. This pension fund started reforming relatively early and
introduced some actuarial adjustments into its schemes from 1997 on. We model the early retirement scheme
following the rules of the ABP fund applied since 1997 for individuals born in 1942 and after (Table 2.1 in
Euwals, van Vuuren, and Woltho (2010)). These individuals were age 60 in 2002 so our SHARE data may
observed some of them. The replacement rate determining the early retirement pension depends on the age
of the individual at retirement and equals 0.7 for ages 61-64, 0.55 for age 60, 0.45 for age 59, 0.38 for age 58,
0.32 for age 57, 0.28 for age 56, and 0.25 for age 55.
The payroll tax is 0.238 (0.179 is paid by the employee) for earnings up to 80% of the economy's average
earnings in 2006. Above this earnings level and up to earnings equal to 116% of average earnings, the
employer pays a payroll tax of 0.0656 to nance disability pensions. The disability pension is set equal to
the pension benet the individual would have received at the normal retirement age.
A-IV Switzerland
The Swiss pension system has two pillars: an earnings related public pension and a mandatory occupational
pension. The normal retirement age is 65 years, and a full pension is received if individuals have contributed
for 44 years to the system. The public pension depends on the individual's average lifetime earnings, and
the pension formula is progressive. If lifetime average earnings are below 0.535 of the average economy's
earnings, the pension equals 13.2% of the economy's average earnings plus 26% of the individual's earnings.
For individuals' earnings above 0.535 of the economy's average earnings, the pension equals 18.55% of the
economy's average earnings plus 16% on the individual's lifetime average earnings. There is also a minimum
pension (17.8% the economy's average earnings) and a maximum pension equal to twice the level of the
minimum pension. Pensions are indexed 50% to prices and 50% to nominal earnings (see OECD (2009)).
In the paper, we assume that pensions are constant as individuals age. Individuals can retire as early as at
age 63 but the pension is reduced by 6.8% for each year of early retirement (until age 65). Late retirement
(after age 65) increases the public pension by 5.2% for 1 year of deferral, by 10.8% for 2 years, 17.1% for 3
41years, 24% for 4 years, and 31.5% for 5 years of deferral. It is possible to claim the public pension at age 65
and continue working but no additional pension entitlements can be earned. Public pensions are nanced
by a payroll tax of 10.1%, half of which is paid by the employer.
The coverage of mandatory occupational pensions is nearly universal (OECD (2009)). Occupational
pensions are related to the individual's contributions. The contribution rate varies between 7% to 18%
depending on age (7% for ages 25-35, 10% for ages 35-45, 15% for ages 45-55, 18% for ages 55-65, and 0% for
individuals older than 65). For an individual retiring at age 65, the occupational pension equals the product
of the sum of contributions and the factor 0.071. In general, early retirement is allowed up to ve years
before the normal retirement age. If the individual retires early, the statutory annuity rate is reduced from
the 7.1% by 0.2% per year of early retirement. Similarly, the annuity rate is increased by 0.2% per year of
late retirement up to ve years.
Regarding disability pensions, the full pension is paid if the insured is assessed at least 70%. In the
paper, we assume that disabled individuals receive the full pension but we apply the penalties for early
retirement.
A-V France
The French pension system has two tiers: an earnings related public pension and a mandatory occupational
pension based on a points scheme (OECD (2009)). A full-pension in the public system requires 40 years
of contributions but before 2003 it was granted with 37.5 years of contributions. In the paper, we assume
that a non-college individual can receive a full pension at age 60, while a college individual can receive a
full pension at age 63. The replacement rate of a full pension is 50%. The pension rate is reduced by 5%
per year of early retirement. If people have reached the qualifying conditions for full pension and work,
each additional year of work increases the public pensions by 3% (this incentive changes from 2007, see page
196 in OECD (2009)). Pensions are indexed to ination. There is a minimum pension equal to 23% of the
economy's average earnings if the individual has contributed 40 years or is older than 65. The maximum
pension equals 50% of the economy's average earnings.
Average earnings are computed over 23 years and they are only adjusted by ination. There is a ceiling
on eligible earnings equal to the economy's average earnings. The payroll tax is 0.1475 (0.082 paid by the
employer) on the insured earnings while the tax rate above that earnings level is 0.017. In addition, a tax
rate of 1% is applied on total earnings to nance disability pensions.
Occupational schemes provide 40% of the pensions for workers in the private sector and contribution to
these complementary schemes became compulsory in 1972 (see Mahieu and Blanchet (2004)). They consist
of 180 schemes that are divided in two main organisms: AGIRC for executive workers and ARRCO for other
workers. In the paper, we model the rules of the ARCCO scheme that apply to wage earners in the private
sector (we do not model the rules for civil servants). The normal retirement age is 65 and there is a quasi-
actuarial adjustment for early retirement (full retirement pension is possible at 37.5 years of contributions
after the 1983 reform). The pension is calculated based on a point system so that it is a dened contribution
system. Individuals accumulate points during their career and at the retirement year a point value is applied
to compute the benet. For earnings below the economy's average earnings a contribution rate of 6% is
applied. Above that earnings level and up to 3 times the economy's average earnings a contribution of
16% applies (OECD (2009)). The number of points earned in a particular year are computed dividing the
contributions by the cost of the pension point that year (13.027 Euros in 2006). The total accumulated points
are multiplied by the point value (1.1241 Euros in 2006) to compute the pension benet at retirement.
Regarding disability pensions, the benet equals 50% of the average earnings in the best 10 years if
incapable of any professional activity up to a maximum of 48% of average earnings in the economy. There
is a minimum pension of 9% of the economy's average earnings. In the paper, we assume that the average
earnings are computed over the full career of the individual type (education and xed eect) and we apply
a replacement rate of 50%. We apply a reduction for early retirement as in the regular pensions.
42APPENDIX B
B-I The Survey of Health and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE)
The Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a European cross-national panel of
micro data on health and socio-economic status which was administered in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010.
It has data on 11 countries and more than 45,000 individuals aged 50 or older. The survey provides a
balanced representation of various European regions: Scandinavia   Denmark and Sweden; Central Europe
  Austria, France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands; and Mediterranean   Spain,
Italy, and Greece. Israel, the Czech Republic, and Poland were added in the 2006 wave. The dataset
provides detailed longitudinal individual data on employment, (sources of) income, (sources of) transfers,
health, consumption, and assets. It is harmonized with the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and
the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA).
We are using the 2004 and 2006 waves   the 2008 wave has been only recently released while the 2010
wave will be released in the near future.
B-I.1 Countries
The 2004 wave includes the following countries: Austria, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy,
France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, and Israel. The 2006 wave includes the following countries:
Austria, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium,
Czech Republic, Poland, and Ireland. We exclude Israel, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Ireland since they
are covered in only one of the waves. In addition, we also exclude Austria, Greece, and Belgium   the facts
from these countries do not change the main message of the paper while excluding them makes cleaner the
presentation of the facts. The facts on all the available countries are available from the authors upon request.
B-I.2 Hours Worked
B-I.2.1 2004
In the 2004 questionnaire, individuals are asked detailed questions about their main and secondary job in
the last month in which they worked. Questions regarding work hours are asked to those individuals who
are currently employed or have worked in the last four weeks or are temporary away from their work. We
use information on (i) total hours worked per week (EP013) and (ii) months worked in the job (EP014) in
order to compute total annual hours for each individual. If an individual has a secondary job, then we add
the hours reported on the second job. We drop those who refused to answer the questions or answered that
they do not know.
 EP013 TOTAL HOURS WORKED PER WEEK: [Regardless of your basic contracted hours]
[how many/How many] hours a week do you usually work in this job, excluding meal breaks [but
including any paid or unpaid overtime]?
 EP014 MONTHS WORKED IN THE JOB (NUMBER): How many months a year are you
normally working in this job (including paid holidays)?
We use the information on annual hours worked in order to classify individuals' labor market participa-
tion: (i) not working: 0 hours, (ii) working part time: 1-1040 hours, and (iii) working full time: more than
1040 hours.
IB-I.2.2 2006
In the 2006 questionnaire, individuals are asked detailed questions about their main job. Questions regarding
work hours are asked to those individuals who are currently employed or have worked in the last four weeks.
We use information on (i) total hours worked per week (EP013) and (ii) months worked in the job (EP014)
in order to compute total annual hours for each individual. If an individual reports also a secondary job,
then we add the hours reported on the second job using the information on (i) total hours worked per week
(in the second job EP321) and (ii) months worked in the second job (EP322). We drop those who refused
to answer the questions or answered that they do not know.
 EP013 TOTAL HOURS WORKED PER WEEK: [Regardless of your basic contracted hours]
[how many/How many] hours a week do you usually work in this job, excluding meal breaks [but
including any paid or unpaid overtime]?
 EP014 MONTHS WORKED IN THE JOB (NUMBER): How many months a year are you
normally working in this job (including paid holidays)?
 EP321 TOTAL HOURS WORKED PER WEEK SECOND JOB: [Regardless of your basic
contracted hours] [how many/How many] hours a week do you usually work in this job, excluding
meal breaks [but including any paid or unpaid overtime]?
 EP014 MONTHS WORKED IN SECOND JOB (NUMBER): How many months a year are
you normally working in this job (including paid holidays)?
We use the information on annual hours worked in order to classify individuals' labor market participa-




In the 2004 questionnaire, individuals are asked detailed questions about their income sources in the year
2003. In order to identify disability insurance recipients, we use information provided in question EP071.
 EP071 INCOME SOURCES IN LAST YEAR: Please look at card 24. Have you received
income from any of these sources in the year 2003? IWER: CODE ALL THAT APPLY.
1. Public old age pension
2. Public early retirement or pre-retirement pension
3. Public disability insurance
4. Public unemployment benet or insurance
5. Public survivor pension from your spouse or partner
6. Public invalidity or incapacity pension
7. War pension
8. Private (occupational) old age pension
9. Private (occupational) early retirement pension
10. Private (occupational) disability or invalidity insurance
11. Private (occupational) survivor pension from your spouse or partner's job
96. None of these
IIWe classify as disability insurance recipients those who reply that they have received [3.] Public dis-
ability insurance, or [6.] Public invalidity or incapacity pension, or [10.] Private (occupational) disability or
invalidity insurance.
We use the information on income sources (EP071) in order to classify individuals' program participation:
(i) SS retired worker benets: EP071=1, 2, or 7; (ii) SS survivor's benets: EP071=5 or 11; (iii) DI benets:
EP071=3, 6, or 10; (iv) UI benets: EP071=4; and (v) Private pension benets: EP071= 8 or 9.
B-I.3.2 2006
In the 2006 questionnaire, individuals are asked detailed questions about their income sources in the year
2005. In order to identify disability insurance recipients, we use information provided in questions EP071
and EP324.
 EP071 INCOME FROM PUBLIC PENSIONS IN LAST YEAR: Please look at card 29.
Have you received income from any of these sources in the year [previous year]? IWER: CODE ALL
THAT APPLY.
1. Public old age pension
2. Public old age supplementary pension or public old age second pension
3. Public early retirement or pre-retirement pension
4. Main public disability insurance pension, or sickness benets
5. Secondary public disability insurance pension, or sickness benets
6. Public unemployment benet or insurance
7. Main public survivor pension from your spouse or partner
8. Secondary public survivor pension from your spouse or partner
9. Public war pension
10. Public long-term care insurance
96. None of these
 EP324 OCCUPATIONAL PENSION INCOME SOURCES: Please look at card 30. Have
you received income from any of these sources in the year [previous year]? IWER: CODE ALL THAT
APPLY.
1. Occupational old age pension from your last job
2. Occupational old age pension from a second job
3. Occupational old age pension from a third job
4. Occupational early retirement pension
5. Occupational disability or invalidity insurance
6. Occupational survivor pension from your spouse or partner's job
96. None of these
We classify as disability insurance recipients those who reply in question EP071 that they have received
[4.] Main public disability insurance pension, or sickness benets, or [5.] Secondary public disability insurance
pension, or sickness benets, or reply in question EP324 [5.] Occupational disability or invalidity insurance.
We use the information on income sources (EP071 and EP324) in order to classify individuals' program
participation: (i) SS retired worker benets: EP071=1, 2, 3, 9, or 10; (ii) SS survivor's benets: EP071=7
or 8, or EP324=6; (iii) DI benets: EP071=4 or 5, or EP324=5; (iv) UI benets: EP071=6; and (v) Private
pension benets: EP324=1, 2, 3, or 4.
IIIThe 2006 questionnaire also asks individuals the following question regarding public benets since the last
interview two years ago (in 2004):
 EP110 RECEIVED PUBLIC BENEFITS: We would also like to know about times since our last
interview through the present in which you received public benets, such as early retirement benets
or unemployment benets. Please look at card 23. Since [month year previous interview] have you
received any of the benets listed on this card? IWER: CODE ALL THAT APPLY.
1. old age pension benets
2. early retirement pension benets
3. unemployment benets
4. sickness benets
5. disability insurance benets
6. social assistance
96. None of these
We use this information in order to construct an alternative measure of the fraction of individuals
receiving disability insurance payments. We classify as disability insurance recipients those who reply in
question EP110 that they have received [4.] sickness benets, or [5.] disability insurance benets.
IVB-II The Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is conducted by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the
University of Michigan in Ann Arbor and supported by the National Institute on Aging (NIA). The study
surveys, over every two years, more than 20,000 Americans over the age of 50. It collects detailed longitudinal
individual data on variables such as income, work, assets, pension plans, health insurance, disability, physical
health and functioning, cognitive functioning, and health care expenditures. We are using the 2004 wave.
B-II.1 Hours Worked
In the 2004 questionnaire, individuals are asked detailed questions about their main job. We use infor-
mation on (i) total hours worked per weekB-1 (J172/Q3509/G44) and (ii) weeks worked during the year
(J179/Q3519/G47) in order to compute total annual hours for each individual. If an individual reports also
another job, then we add the hours reported on the other job using the information on (i) total hours worked
per week (in the other job J556/Q3840/G129) and (ii) weeks worked in the other job (J557/Q3841/G130).
We drop those who refused to answer the questions or answered that they do not know.
 J172/Q3509/G44 TOTAL HOURS WORKED PER WEEK: How many hours a week do you
usually work [on this job/in this business]?
 J179/Q3519/G47 WEEKS WORKED: Counting paid vacations as weeks of work, how many
weeks a year do you usually work on this job?
 J556/Q3840/G129 TOTAL HOURS WORKED PER WEEK OTHER JOB: How many
hours a week do you usually work on [this other job/these other jobs]?
 J557/Q3841/G130 WEEKS WORKED IN OTHER JOB: Counting paid vacations as weeks
of work, how many weeks a year do you usually work on (this other job/these other jobs)?
We use the information on annual hours worked in order to classify individuals' labor market participa-
tion: (i) not working: 0 hours, (ii) working part time: 1-1040 hours, and (iii) working full time: more than
1040 hours.
Overall, as seen on Figure B-1, the annual hours worked after the age of 50 in the HRS and the PSID
are similar for both non-college and college individuals.
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B-1The HRS also collects information regarding whether weekly hours worked vary a lot from week to week.
If they do vary a lot, then the HRS asks about weekly hours in a relatively short and long week.
VB-II.2 Disability
In the 2004 questionnaire, individuals are asked a series of very detailed disability questions.B-2 Individuals
face dierent sets of questions depending on whether they have been interviewed before or not.
 First Interview. Individuals who are interviewed for the rst time are asked detailed questions
about whether they have ever applied to the following disability insurance programs: (i) Social Se-
curity Disability program (SSDI), (ii) Supplemental Security Income Program (SSIP), (iii) Veterans
Administration (VA), (iv) Workers' Compensation Program (WCP), and (v) Other Public Disability
Income Program (OPDIP). We classify workers as disability insurance recipients if they reply that
they have applied in the past to one of these disability insurance programs, their application was
accepter, and they are still receiving the benets. In addition, we also consider to be disability insur-
ance recipients those who have applied in the past to one of these disability insurance programs, their
application was rejected, they appealed, their application was eventually accepted, and they are still
receiving the benets.
 Interviewed in the Past. Individuals who have been interviewed in the past are divided into three
groups depending on whether at the last interview they reported that: (i) they were receiving SSDI,
SSI, VA, or WCP benets, (ii) they had applied for SSDI, SSI, VA, or WCP benets, and (iii) they
were not receiving and had not applied for SSDI, SSI, VA, or WCP benets. We classify as disability
insurance recipients all those who meet at least one of the following criteria:
(i) For those receiving SSDI, SSI, VA, or WCP benets at the last interview:
{ still receiving these benets.
(ii) For those that had applied for SSDI, SSI, VA, or WCP benets at the last interview:
{ their application was accepted, and they are still receiving the benets; or
{ their application was rejected, they appealed, their application was eventually accepted,
and they are still receiving the benets.
(iii) For those that were not receiving and had not applied for SSDI, SSI, VA, or WCP benets at
the last interview:
{ they applied for benets since the last interview, their application was accepted, and they
are still receiving the benets; or
{ they applied for benets since the last interview, their application was rejected, they ap-
pealed, their application was eventually accepted, and they are still receiving the benets.
Finally, the question about the individual's current status also provides information on disability, but
this is a less reliable method than the one described above.
 J005/Q3365/G1 CURRENT STATUS: Now I'm going to ask you some questions about your
current employment situation. Are you working now, temporarily laid o, unemployed and looking
for work, disabled and unable to work, retired, a homemaker, or what?
One use this information in order to construct a measure of the fraction of individuals claiming to be
disabled. Individual can be classied as disabled if they reply reply in question J005/Q3365/G1 that they
are [4.] disabled.
B-2The structure of disability questions in the HRS diers from the on in the SHARE.
VIB-III Tables
Table B-1: Labor Market Participation, Men, SHARE 2004, Non-college.
Age
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
Switzerland
Working full time 76.7 84.6 57.8 22.5 13.2
Working part time 11.7 0.0 4.4 5.0 2.6
Not working 11.6 15.4 37.8 72.5 84.2
Sweden
Working full time 88.5 72.6 51.6 6.2 1.4
Working part time 3.6 5.1 9.3 10.7 5.5
Not working 7.9 22.3 39.1 83.1 93.1
Denmark
Working full time 80.0 74.1 41.0 5.6 0.0
Working part time 1.0 2.4 6.0 14.8 8.9
Not working 19.0 23.5 53.0 79.6 91.1
Netherlands
Working full time 79.7 58.8 18.8 2.5 1.2
Working part time 2.9 8.8 2.3 4.9 2.3
Not working 17.4 32.4 78.9 92.6 96.5
Germany
Working full time 73.1 59.6 20.2 4.8 0.0
Working part time 3.2 4.4 5.8 3.2 0.9
Not working 23.7 36.0 74.0 92.0 99.1
Spain
Working full time 70.1 57.5 27.7 2.8 1.3
Working part time 7.7 9.4 9.5 0.7 0.6
Not working 22.2 33.1 62.8 96.5 98.1
Italy
Working full time 59.8 43.1 18.0 6.7 3.6
Working part time 19.7 5.4 5.8 3.9 1.2
Not working 20.5 51.5 76.2 89.4 95.2
France
Working full time 76.4 51.0 7.6 0.8 0.7
Working part time 1.9 2.5 2.1 0.0 0.0
Not working 21.7 46.5 90.3 99.3 99.3
United States
Working full time 70.6 64.8 44.1 21.3 11.2
Working part time 2.6 3.5 6.9 8.7 9.2
Not working 26.8 31.7 49.0 70.0 79.6
Note: Authors' computations from the 2004 SHARE for the European countries and the 2004 HRS for the US.
VIITable B-2: Labor Market Participation, Men, SHARE 2004, College.
Age
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
Switzerland
Working full time 83.9 76.5 53.6 43.8 9.5
Working part time 9.6 11.7 7.1 18.7 9.5
Not working 6.5 11.8 39.3 37.5 81.0
Sweden
Working full time 98.3 91.4 58.1 12.1 3.4
Working part time 0.0 1.7 14.5 18.2 13.8
Not working 1.7 6.9 27.4 69.7 82.8
Denmark
Working full time 80.6 64.8 55.1 10.5 0.0
Working part time 3.3 7.4 4.1 18.4 15.4
Not working 16.1 27.8 40.8 71.1 84.6
Netherlands
Working full time 89.0 77.8 28.4 1.3 3.8
Working part time 2.2 1.9 4.6 2.5 1.9
Not working 8.8 20.3 67.0 96.2 94.3
Germany
Working full time 85.3 86.0 36.4 10.2 2.2
Working part time 1.1 0.0 7.0 5.7 4.5
Not working 13.6 14.0 56.6 84.1 93.3
Spain
Working full time 70.6 76.9 50.0 0.1 20.0
Working part time 5.9 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Not working 23.5 15.4 50.0 99.9 80.0
Italy
Working full time 81.3 73.7 30.4 33.3 12.5
Working part time 18.7 5.2 17.4 0.0 0.0
Not working 0.0 21.1 52.2 66.7 87.5
France
Working full time 84.8 68.7 28.6 8.9 0.0
Working part time 6.3 0.0 7.1 2.9 0.1
Not working 8.9 31.3 64.3 88.2 99.9
United States
Working full time 84.6 76.4 49.9 32.1 14.2
Working part time 3.4 4.4 12.9 15.0 16.4
Not working 12.0 19.2 37.2 52.9 69.4
Note: Authors' computations from the 2004 SHARE for the European countries and the 2004 HRS for the US.
VIIITable B-3: Program Participation, Men, SHARE 2004: Non-college.
Age
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
Switzerland
SS retired worker benets 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.0 97.3
DI benets 8.1 17.1 13.0 2.3 10.8
UI benets 10.2 0.0 4.3 2.3 2.7
Private pension benets 0.0 4.9 21.7 39.5 54.1
Sweden
SS retired worker benets 2.1 14.4 22.2 83.1 99.9
DI benets 14.1 14.9 16.2 12.4 13.2
UI benets 0.7 1.0 2.7 17.4 17.4
Private pension benets 6.3 5.0 10.3 22.5 13.2
Denmark
SS retired worker benets 0.0 3.6 38.1 83.6 99.9
DI benets 13.7 15.5 11.9 7.2 0.0
UI benets 8.8 11.9 2.4 1.8 0.0
Private pension benets 1.0 0.0 14.3 29.1 26.8
Netherlands
SS retired worker benets 0.0 1.4 2.3 84.4 99.9
DI benets 18.1 23.2 25.8 8.2 0.0
UI benets 4.8 7.2 5.5 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 0.0 3.6 43.8 69.7 74.1
Germany
SS retired worker benets 1.2 6.0 48.6 93.1 97.2
DI benets 8.4 9.5 9.2 1.6 2.8
UI benets 13.2 15.5 7.5 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 0.0 0.9 10.4 23.4 29.9
Spain
SS retired worker benets 3.4 10.1 34.8 88.0 91.6
DI benets 16.0 12.4 11.3 4.9 4.5
UI benets 6.7 3.1 8.5 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 0.8 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.6
Italy
SS retired worker benets 7.8 37.0 66.7 82.8 86.7
DI benets 7.0 8.2 7.7 8.3 6.1
UI benets 0.9 1.4 1.4 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 0.0 2.4 5.3 5.0 6.1
France
SS retired worker benets 2.9 16.2 74.8 97.0 99.9
DI benets 7.2 9.1 0.7 3.7 3.8
UI benets 6.7 9.1 6.3 1.5 0.0
Private pension benets 1.0 5.1 52.4 69.6 72.9
Note: Authors' computations from the 2004 SHARE.
IXTable B-4: Program Participation, Men, SHARE 2004: College.
Age
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
Switzerland
SS retired worker benets 0.0 3.0 6.3 76.5 99.9
DI benets 3.1 3.0 6.3 5.9 0.0
UI benets 3.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 0.0 9.0 28.1 29.4 65.0
Sweden
SS retired worker benets 0.0 3.3 19.4 82.4 99.9
DI benets 5.1 8.3 12.9 23.5 13.3
UI benets 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 0.0
Private pension benets 1.7 5.0 14.5 5.9 0.0
Denmark
SS retired worker benets 0.0 3.7 27.5 64.9 99.9
DI benets 10.9 13.0 15.7 8.0 0.0
UI benets 9.4 16.7 7.8 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 1.6 1.9 13.7 54.1 65.4
Netherlands
SS retired worker benets 0.0 0.6 1.8 82.1 98.1
DI benets 8.0 11.5 12.8 3.8 0.0
UI benets 2.9 4.5 6.4 2.6 0.0
Private pension benets 0.0 7.0 42.2 80.8 88.5
Germany
SS retired worker benets 3.3 4.3 43.0 87.6 93.3
DI benets 0.0 5.3 5.0 0.0 0.0
UI benets 8.9 3.2 8.0 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 0.0 2.1 10.0 20.2 24.4
Spain
SS retired worker benets 0.0 7.7 40.0 83.3 80.0
DI benets 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0
UI benets 5.9 15.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Italy
SS retired worker benets 0.0 15.8 60.9 58.3 75.0
DI benets 6.3 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0
UI benets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 0.0 0.0 8.7 8.3 25.0
France
SS retired worker benets 0.0 9.1 54.8 97.1 99.9
DI benets 3.7 3.0 0.0 5.9 0.0
UI benets 1.2 3.0 7.1 0.0 0.0
Private pension benets 0.0 3.0 28.6 52.9 80.0
Note: Authors' computations from the 2004 SHARE.
XTable B-5: Tax Function Parameters.
US Spain France Switzerland Netherlands Italy
Min. taxed (
y
W ) 0.02 0.44 0.00 0.13 0.40 0.44
Min. Tax 0.0 0.0 0.076 0.0 0.0 0.0
Max. Tax 0.354 0.383 0.468 0.364 0.463 0.406
a0 -0.24 -0.53 -0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -9.87
a1 -0.0097 -0.022 -1.87 -2.13 -3.97 -0.024
a2 0.42 0.67 2.04 2.27 4.21 10.06
 0.22 0.24 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.018
R2 0.997 0.998 0.993 0.998 0.977 0.995
Table B-6: Stochastic Process of Hourly Wages, United States: Model vs. Data.
Non-college College
Data Model Data Model
Var() 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.07
 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.97
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